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ABSTRACT
Many retailers are adopting a dual-channel retailing strategy (DCRS) in which products
are offered through two channels: physical stores and online stores. Due to regulations or
competitive measures, such a strategy allows customers who find a purchase unsatisfactory to
obtain a full refund through a same-channel return or a cross-channel return. No papers have
collectively studied the aforementioned types of customer returns in a dual-channel context. This
paper studies optimal pricing policies for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer
(DCR) with same- and cross-channel returns. How dual-channel pricing behaviour is impacted
by customer preference and rates of customer returns is discussed. It is found, through sensitivity
analysis, that when a channel with significant customer preference faces a high rate of returns,
decentralized channels generate a greater system profit for retailers than coordinated channels
that have a unified pricing strategy. A DCR with a Stackelberge scheme has the proclivity to be
more profitable when under the leadership of a channel with a high rate of returns and significant
customer preference.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
This work analyzes the problem of customer returns under a dual-channel retailing

system. It is motivated by the fact that online customers may return their unsatisfactory
purchases to a retailer’s physical store where they can be resold again (e.g. such the case in WalMart, Costco, and Target). Consequently, the two channels are greatly intermingled and a
decision for one channel should not be taken in isolation. The main goal of this research is to
develop proper methodologies of price management and inventory control management when the
demand is deterministic.
Both the rapid development of the Internet and the growth of third-party logistics
providers have inspired 80% of US retailers to adopt a dual-channel retail strategy (Zhang et al.
2010). Such a strategy offers retail businesses several advantages. For example, it allows retailers
to reach wider segments of customers and increase revenue (Ryan, Sun and Zhao 2013). Also, it
enables retailers to satisfy increasing customer demands for multiple channels through which to
shop. Thus, using a DCRS increases customer loyalty and satisfaction (Zhang et al. 2010).
According to Chiang and Monahan (2005), such a strategy adds flexibility to a retailer’s supply
chain. This flexibility allows customers to view a product’s description online and purchase it at
a physical store, order a product online and pick it up from a physical store, or purchase a
product online and return it to a physical store. A DCR can use differential pricing strategy to
direct customer traffic depending on a retailer’s best interest (Zhang et al. 2010).
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However, DCRS also comes with sever drawbacks. As Webb and Hogan (2002) have
stated, “goal incompatibility” (between physical stores and online stores, for example) is an
inevitable result if channels are not integrated. Channels may generate internal conflict due to
scarce resources (for example, a tight budget or few customers) or tight objectives (for example,
a targeted revenue and profit). Such a conflict will in turn spark competition and trigger a price
war that may harm the parties involved. Consequently, channels may limit their cooperation and
customers are inspired to change companies due to confusion and agitation (Steinfield 2004).
This competition may be so intense that one channel may sabotage another. For example, Levi
Strauss and Best Buy had terminated their online stores after a few years of their first operational
trial due to internal competition (Yan 2010; Falk et al. 2007). Webb and Hogan’s research
supports this; they found that 66% of 50 interviewed retail businesses viewed channel conflict as
the most troublesome issue that is faced when they run dual-retailing channels.
Intuitively, one may argue that all of those drawbacks could be eliminated by integration
and price coordination. That is true. However, most dual-channel retailers (i.e., Target, Nike,
Kmart, Barnes and Noble, Jo-Ann Fabric and Craft Stores, and Kohl’s) still use decentralized
teams to run their stores due to the high cost of coordination and the operational difficulties
associated with it (Zhang et al. 2010; Yan et al. 2010; Neslin and Shankar 2009; Yan 2008;
Berger et al. 2006; Webb and Hogan 2002; Schoenbachler and Gordon 2002). Also, a variety of
managerial skills are needed for different channels; thus, some retailers may even outsource the
management of unfamiliar or newly opened channels to a third party. An example is Toys“R”Us,
which outsourced the management of its online channel to Amazon (Berger et al. 2006).
Since online customers do not experience products prior to purchasing them, the transfer
from the traditional retailing system to the DCRS may cause a noticeable growth in the number
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of customer purchase returns. According to Akcay, Boyaci and Zhang (2013), Mostard and
Teunter (2006), and Vlachos and Dekker (2003) fashion products purchased in person through
physical channels can have return rates as high as 35%. In contradistinction, fashion products
purchased online can have return rates as high as 75%. Also, the implementation of the full
refund policy increases the number of customer purchase returns. However, many retailers use
this policy in order to increase customer loyalty, provide customer satisfaction, boost sales,
and/or comply with country legislations. In the United States and Canada, yearly returns to
merchants total between $100 and $10 billion dollars of products, respectively (Akcay, Boyaci
and Zhang 2013; Chen and Bell 2009; Su 2009). While defective returns constitute only 5% of
all customer returns, a significant amount of returned apparel is of good quality and can be resold
several times without a recovery process (Akcay, Boyaci and Zhang 2013; Su 2009).
Many DCRs (for example, Wal-Mart or Toys“R”Us) allow same-channel returns,
wherein an item purchased from their physical store is returned to their physical store, or an item
purchased from their online store is returned to their online store. However, many also allow
cross-channel returns, wherein a product purchased from their online store may be returned to
their physical store. Allowing cross-channel returns is vital for online stores as such a policy
increases sales and customer satisfaction and allow physical stores to create additional crossselling opportunities (Zhang et al. 2010; Cao and Li 2015). However, if cross-channel returned
items are not offered at the physical store, then the items must be shipped to the online store
(Zhang et al. 2010). Otherwise the ownership of such items is transferred to the physical store.
This is done by conducting an inventory transfer that is subject to the retailer’s internal rules.
The retailer’s policy and practice of having cross-channel returns can be acquired through partial
integration. As Cao and Li (2015) have stated, channels will only have full integration when
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prices align to meet the retailer’s goals and objectives. That is to say, cross-channel returns do
not contradict the fact that channels of a DCR may still undergo price competition.
Several studies have considered competition and possible coordination strategies between
dual channels, which are owned by either the same retailer or different enterprises. The customer
returns topic has also been thoroughly studied in single retailer or two retailers systems.
However, few papers have studied customer returns under a DCRS. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no work related to a DCRS that has collectively considered all forms of
same-channel returns and cross-returning an original online store’s item to the physical store.
Also, there is no published paper that has studied the impact of cross-channel returns on both
stores of a DCR, especially when those returns are resalable. For example, the effect of crosschannel returns on channels’ pricing policies and inventory management has not being studied
yet. Therefore, this paper investigates optimal pricing policies for a centralized and decentralized
DCR with same-channel returns and cross-channel returns. Both centralization with differential
and unified pricing schemes, and competition in regards to theoretical game frameworks are
addressed.
This paper is organized in a logical manner. Related works are reviewed in Section 2
while the paper’s statement of the problem is in Section 3. Then centralized and decentralized
management styles are both discussed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 discusses the
paper’s sensitivity analysis and Section 7 provides managerial insights. Finally, conclusions and
suggested future research are presented in Section 8.
2.

RELATED WORKS
This section sheds the light upon two streams of literature. The first stream addresses

dual-channel systems under two settings: manufacturer-retailer setting and multi-channel
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retailing setting. Considerable research works have analyzed systems that contain a manufacturer
that sells a single product to customers through both a manufacturer or supplier-owned online
store and an independent retail store(s). Several different types of competition take place
between the two channels, including competition in price (David, and Adida 2015; Balakrishnan,
Sundaresan and Zhang 2014; Ryan, Sun and Zhao 2013), competition in services (Dan, Xu and
Liu 2012), and competition in product availability (Takahashi et al. 2011; Chiang and Monahan
2005). Existing literature shows that decentralized systems are a representation of a situation
wherein each channel seeks to maximize its own profit in the presence of cannibalization (David,
and Adida 2015; Ryan, Sun and Zhao 2013; Dan, Xu and Liu 2012; Huang, Yang and Zhang
2012; Chen, Zhang and Sun 2012; Hua, Wang and Cheng 2010). In a coordinated or centralized
duopolistic system, each player maximizes its own profit. However, it is done within the
boundaries of a contract (David, and Adida 2015; Ryan, Sun and Zhao 2013; Chen, Zhang and
Sun 2012). A fully coordinated or centralized monopolistic system uses a sole decision maker to
maximize the system’s total profit (Huang, Yang and Zhang 2012; Hua, Wang and Cheng 2010).
Other papers in literature have examined the situation wherein a multi-channel retailer
offers the same product in both self-owned online and physical stores. Yan et al. (2010), Yan
(2010), and Yan (2008) all studied Bertrand-Nash, online-Stackelberge and retailer-Stackelberge
games to model the price competition that stems from operating a multi-channel retailing system.
Each of the studies stated that the Stackelberge games always outperform the Bertrand-Nash
game. Huang and Swaminathan (2009) studied four pricing strategies commonly used by
monopolistic DCRs. They also considered a duopoly case in which an established DCR faces
competition from a new offline entrant. Additionally, Berger et al. (2006) examined the profit
enhancement induced by a multi-channel retailer that integrates the advertisement efforts of both
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online and physical stores. Each study presented above examined the possible coordination
strategies or policies between different competing channels in a dual-channel system. None of
the papers have considered customer returns and the impact that the returns have had on optimal
pricing strategies.
The second stream addresses customer returns under three settings: single retailer setting,
two retailers setting, and multi-channel retailing setting. Before we review the papers under the
different settings, it is adequate to examine the researchers findings in regard to the different
refund policies. A large body of work on customer returns has examined a refund policy that is
exogenously determined as a full refund or a Money Back Guarantee (MBG) (Chang and Yeh
2013; Chen and Bell 2013; Choi et al. 2013; Akcay, Boyaci and Zhang 2013; Wang, Tung and
Lee 2010; You, Ikuta and Hsieh 2010; Vlachos and Dekker 2003). Other papers have compared
a system’s performance with no refund policy to a system’s performance with a full refund
policy (Chen and Grewal 2013; Choi et al. 2013; Chen and Bell 2012; Chen and Zhang 2011).
Several papers that conducted such a comparison also examined a partial refund policy (Li, Xu
and Li 2013; Su 2009; Yalabik, Petruzzi and Chhajed 2005). Hsiao and Chen (2012) found that
the optimal refund policy may exceed the full price of the item. Su (2009), Chen and Bell (2009),
and Yalabik, Petruzzi and Chhajed (2005) all argued that a full refund policy is not optimal as it
overwhelms retailing systems. In contrast, Chen and Zhang (2011) argued that a full refund
policy may be optimal in the presence of competition. However, Hu, Li and Govindan (2014)
and Su (2009) claimed that the optimal refund policy depends upon the refunded product’s
salvage value. According to Li, Xu and Li (2013), retailers should offer either a lenient return
policy with a low quality and a low price or a strict return policy with a high quality and a high
price. Moreover, Yu and Goh (2012) stated that retailers should enforce a return policy that takes
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the nature of products and their condition upon return into consideration. Akcay, Boyaci and
Zhang (2013) encouraged retailers to reduce the number of returns they receive by controlling
selling prices and enforcing a refund policy with restocking fees. However, Hu and Li (2012)
argued that offering a manufacturer buyback price equivalent to the retailer’s refund price is the
optimal coordinating mechanism.
Additionally, many papers have considered a retailer faces returns from unsatisfied
customers. Akcay, Boyaci and Zhang (2013) studied a system wherein customers could
differentiate between a new sell and a resell but their product valuation was uncertain. Yu and
Goh (2012) examined a retailer facing eight different scenarios. The eight scenarios had several
combinations that consisted of whether or not returns occurred within a grace period, whether or
not returns were accompanied by a penalty, and whether or not returns were recoverable.
Additionally, according to You, Ikuta and Hsieh (2010), a single selling period can be divided
into N countable sub-periods. Each sub-period is associated with a probability of return. Chen
and Bell (2009) did not allow “as good as new” returns to be sold in the same period in which
they were sold, but did allow them to be salvaged in a single-period setting or resold in the
following period in a multi-period setting. Vlachos and Dekker (2003) studied six different
systems according to whether or not returns could be resold in the primary market, whether or
not resalable returns needed a recovery process, and whether or not the needed recovery process
was associated with fixed or variable costs. Wang, Tung and Lee (2010) investigated a system
wherein customer returns could be resold several times. Selling periods were divided into three
sub-periods: a period in which sales consumed both new and returned stocks, a period in which
sales only consumed returned stocks, and a period in which there were only returns, not sales. Li,
Xu and Li (2013), Hsiao and Chen (2012), and Mukhopadhyay and Setaputra (2007) discussed
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the interrelationship between price, refund policy, and quality. Choi et al. (2013) and
Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2005) examined a system in which demand is linearly dependant
on price, return, and modularity level, while return is linearly dependant on return policy.
Several other papers have considered customer returns when two retailers compete in the
same market. Chen and Bell (2012) examined a system with two customer behaviours: returnsensitive customers willing to pay more and enjoy the privilege of returning a product if it is a
mismatch, and price-sensitive customers willing to pay less and keep the product if it is a
mismatch. Both a returnable channel and a non-returnable channel are thus considered in Chen
and Bell’s study. Furthermore, Chen and Grewal (2013) studied Stackelberge and Bertrand-Nash
competitions in situations wherein a new channel competes with a well-established retailer that
offers a full refund policy. Additionally, Chen and Zhang (2011) studied Stackelberge and
Bertrand-Nash competitions between two retailers that both offered a full refund policy.
Balakrishnan, Sundaresan and Zhang (2014) studied the browse and switch behavior exerted by
consumers on the brick and mortar stores. The effect of such a behavior on system’s profits and
prices are examined when returns are allowed for online purchases only. Ofek, Katona and
Sarvary (2009) studied competion in pricing and assistance level between two retailers that may
operate a single channel (“bricks”) or dual-channels (“bricks and clicks”).
Widodo et al. (2010) and Widodo et al. (2009) studied both Nash and Stackelberge
competitions between a retailer’s physical and online channels. Contrary to practice, they studied
returns that were only allowed for online purchases. Online customers were allowed to return
items to the online store (a same-channel return) or the physical store (a cross-channel return).
The study assumed that returns could be exchanged but not refunded.

9

One should note that no author has collectively considered all forms of same-channel
returns and cross returning an original online store’s item to the physical store. Also, the impact
of cross-channel returns on both stores has not being studied yet. There is thus a research gap in
this area. Accordingly, this paper studies both same-channel and cross-channel returns
encountered by a DCR. It analyzes the effect that such returns have on optimal prices.
Centralization with differential and unified pricing strategies is addressed. Additionally, this
paper studies theoretical game competition between stores using the following frameworks: the
Online-Leader Stackelberge game, the Physical-Leader Stackelberge game, and the Nash game.
3.

PROBLEM STATEMENT
This paper considers merchants that run both a physical store and an online store. It

examines two coordination schemes: one in which channels are managed collectively in a
centralized setting and one in which channels are managed competitively in a decentralized
setting. Customers may receive a full refund for purchases returned within a merchant-specified
time period. The probability that a product purchased from a physical store is returned to a
physical store is 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 1. The probability that a product purchased from an online store is
returned to an online store is 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1. The probability that a product purchased from an
online store is cross-returned to a physical store is 0 ≤ 𝑣 ≤ 1 (Figure 1). The assumption of
ratios for returns has been implemented in literature before, such as in works by Chen and
Grewal (2013), Mostard and Teunter (2006), Mostard, Koster and Teunter (2005), Vlachos and
Dekker (2003), and many more.
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Figure 1: A dual-channel retailer with same- and cross-channel returns
Akcay, Boyaci and Zhang (2013) have stated that a sold item is often returned “as good
as new”; thus, it can be resold at least one more time during a selling season. Therefore, for a
returned product to be resalable it must be returned in its original packaging and condition. We
assume that a returned product has a resalability rate of 𝑘𝑟 if the item was purchased from and
returned to a physical store, 𝑘𝑜 if the item was purchased from and returned to an online store,
and 𝑘𝑜𝑟 if the item was purchased from an online store but cross-returned to a physical store.
Due to the seasonal length constraint, all same-channel resalable returns can be resold once more
from their original channels. Regardless of the number of times an item is sold in the online
store, all cross-channel resalable returns can be resold once from the physical store. Readers are
reminded here that those assumptions are most likely valid when a retailer faces a single selling
period such as in the apparel industry.
Each returned item is associated with a return collection cost of the value 𝑑. If an item is
returned as not resalable or as resalable after the end of the selling season, then its salvage value,
𝑠, is acquired by selling the item in a secondary market. The unit’s salvage value must be less
than or equal to the unit’s purchasing cost 𝑠 ≤ 𝑐; otherwise the profit function would be
unbounded above. Due to salvaging, the retailer will have no inventory after the end of the
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selling season. Thus, the holding cost is not considered in this paper. Items that are purchased
from or returned to the online store will cost the store a per-unit shipping expense of 𝑡.
𝐷𝑟 and 𝐷𝑜 denote total customer sales within the physical store and the online store,
respectively. It follows from sales certainty that a store will experience no further sales once this
totality is met. Therefore, a channel will have no back orders. 𝑄𝑟 and 𝑄𝑜 are the order quantities
placed at the physical store and the online store at the beginning of the selling season,
respectively. Since the ordering process is not repetitive and is not related to the order quantity,
then its related cost can be safely ignored. The parameter 𝛼 represents the base level of sales, or
the sales level when items are offered to customers free of charge (Chen, Zhang and Sun 2012;
Huang, Yang and Zhang 2012). If 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 is the degree of customer preference for the
physical store, then 𝛼𝑟 = 𝛼𝜃 is the physical store’s base level of sales. Similarly, if 1 − 𝜃 is the
degree of customer preference for the online store, then 𝛼𝑜 = 𝛼(1 − 𝜃) is the online store’s base
level of sales. According to Hua, Wang and Cheng (2010), different products lead to different
degrees of customer preference for the physical store. For example, products that are customized,
require a high level of examination prior to being purchased (such as used cars, clothes, shoes, or
eyeglasses), or require after-sale services (such as electronics) better fit physical stores. In
contradistinction, products that do not require a high level of examination in regards to their
quality level prior to being purchased, standardized, or mature (such as books and CDs) better fit
online stores. Physical and online store sales functions are given as:
𝐷𝑟 = 𝛼𝑟 − 𝛽𝑝𝑟 + 𝛾𝑝𝑜 and
𝐷𝑜 = 𝛼𝑜 − 𝛽𝑝𝑜 + 𝛾𝑝𝑟 , respectively.
𝛽 is an ownership-price sensitivity that measures the rate at which sales are affected by a
channel’s own price. 𝛾 is the cross-price sensitivity that reflects the degree of cannibalization
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between two channels. A channel’s cross-price sensitivity has a lesser effect on sales than a
channel’s ownership-price sensitivity, which is 𝛾 < 𝛽. Linear sales functions in a dual-channel
system were utilized in Ryan, Sun and Zhao (2013), Huang, Yang and Zhang (2012), Chen,
Zhang and Sun (2012), Bin, Rong and Meidan (2010), and more.
Since the studied retailing system allows customer returns and a portion of those returns
can be resold in the same selling season, then it is intuitive to see that a channel’s order quantity
is lower than its total sales. To further clarify this concept, an online store will sell its order
quantity (𝑄𝑜 ) and all of its same-channel resalable returns (𝑤𝑘𝑜 𝑄𝑜 ). Thus 𝐷𝑜 = 𝑄𝑜 (1 + 𝑤𝑘𝑜 ).
The order quantity is given as the following:
𝐷

𝑜
𝑄𝑜 = 1+𝑤𝑘
.

(1)

𝑜

Due to the ratio 𝑣, a quantity of 𝑣𝐷𝑜 is cross-returned from the online store to the
physical store. A portion, 𝑘𝑜𝑟 of this quantity, is resalable and can be resold once to satisfy part
of the physical store’s total sales 𝐷𝑟 . Thus, the physical store will sell its order quantity (𝑄𝑟 ), all
of its same-channel resalable returns (𝑟𝑘𝑟 𝑄𝑟 ), and all of the cross-channel resalable returns
(𝑣𝑘𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑜 ). Consequently, 𝐷𝑟 = 𝑄𝑟 (1 + 𝑟𝑘𝑟 ) + 𝐷𝑜 𝑣𝑘𝑜𝑟 and the order quantity is given as the
following:
𝑄𝑟 =

𝐷𝑟 −𝐷𝑜 𝑣𝑘𝑜𝑟
1+𝑟𝑘𝑟

.

(2)

Notice that the 𝐷𝑜 𝑣𝑘𝑜𝑟 is conditioned to be less than or equal to 𝐷𝑟 (i.e. 𝑄𝑟 ≥ 0); otherwise the
physical store would be overwhelmed by cross-channel returns that would allow the store to start
its selling season without any quantity ordered from the supplier. Such a case is unrealistic; thus,
its analytical complications are omitted from the calculations.
The following two sections examine the integration of a DCR under a centralized
management using two pricing strategies: differential pricing mode and uniform pricing mode.
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They also examine online and physical stores’ equilibriums when the stores use three different
competitive pricing schemes: Online-Leader Stackelberge game, Physical-Leader Stackelberge
game and Nash game. In the Online-Leader Stackelberge game, a retailer’s online store leads. It
announces its selling price first and is followed by its physical store. In the Physical-Leader
Stackelberge game, a retailer’s physical store leads. The store announces its selling price first
and is followed by its online store. However, in the Nash game both channels are equally
powerful in price determination. Thus, they set their price strategies simultaneously. Table 1
presents a summary of the notations used in this paper.
Table 1: Notations

Notation
𝒓

Description
Probability an item purchased from a physical store is returned to the physical
store

𝒘

Probability an item purchased from an online store is returned to the online store

𝒗

Probability an item purchased from an online store is cross-returned to a physical
store

𝒌𝒓

Probability an item purchased from and returned to a physical store is resalable

𝒌𝒐

Probability an item purchased from and returned to an online store is resalable

𝒌𝒐𝒓

Probability an item purchased from an online store and cross-returned to a
physical store is resalable

𝒄 and 𝒔

Unit purchasing cost and salvage value, respectively

𝒅 and 𝒕

Return collection and shipping costs, respectively

𝒄̂

Amount a physical store pays to an online store for every cross-channel return in
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the decentralization scheme
𝑫𝒓 and 𝑫𝒐

Retail and online stores’ total sales including returns, respectively

𝑸𝒓 and 𝑸𝒐

Quantities ordered by retail and online stores, respectively

𝜶, 𝜶𝒓 and

Enterprise, physical store and online store base levels of sale, respectively

𝜶𝒐
𝜽

Customer preference for the physical store

𝜷 and 𝜸

Ownership price and cross-price sensitivities of a channel, respectively

𝒑𝒓 and 𝒑𝒐

Retail and online store’s prices, respectively

𝝅, 𝝅𝒓 and Enterprise, physical store and online store profits, respectively
𝝅𝒐
4.

CENTRALIZED DUAL-CHANNEL RETAILING SYSTEM
This section studies pricing policies in a centralized system wherein a retailer’s physical

and online stores are vertically integrated. One may assume the existence of a central decision
maker who pursues the maximum total supply chain profit (𝜋). The central decision maker
simultaneously determines the physical store’s price, 𝑝𝑟 , and the online store’s price, 𝑝𝑜 , to meet
the retailer’s goals and objectives.
The online store’s profit function is modeled as the following:
(𝑤𝑘 )2

𝑜
𝜋𝑜𝑐 = 𝐷𝑜 [(1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣)𝑝𝑜 − 𝑡 − 𝑤(𝑑 + 𝑡) + 𝑤(1 − 𝑘𝑜 )𝑠 + 𝑠 1+𝑤𝑘
] − 𝑄𝑜 𝑐.
𝑜

(3)

A portion from 𝐷𝑜 , (1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣), is a final sale and contributes positively. Every sold
item contributes negatively due to the shipped cost 𝑡 paid by the store. A 𝑤 portion from 𝐷𝑜 is
returned to the online store and contributes negatively due to collection and shipping costs. A
portion of 𝑤(1 − 𝑘𝑜 ) from 𝐷𝑜 is salvaged and contributes positively as it is returned as non-
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(𝑤𝑘 )2

𝑜
resalable. The term 𝑠 1+𝑤𝑘
assures the salvaging of an item that end up being returned as
𝑜

resalable after the end of the selling season. The second term is the ordering cost for the quantity
assigned to the online store.
The physical store’s profit function is modeled as:
(𝑟𝑘 )2

𝑘

𝑟𝑘

𝑟
𝑜𝑟 𝑟
𝜋𝑟𝑐 = 𝐷𝑟 [(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑟 − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟(1 − 𝑘𝑟 )𝑠 + 𝑠 1+𝑟𝑘
] + 𝑣𝐷𝑜 [−𝑑 + (1 − 𝑘𝑜𝑟 )𝑠 + 𝑠 1+𝑟𝑘
] − 𝑄𝑟 𝑐.
𝑟

𝑟

(4)
In the first term, a portion of (1 − 𝑟) from 𝐷𝑟 is a final sale and contributes positively, a
portion of 𝑟 from 𝐷𝑟 is returned to the physical store and contributes negatively due to its
collection cost, and a portion of 𝑟(1 − 𝑘𝑟 ) from 𝐷𝑟 is salvaged and contributes positively as it is
(𝑟𝑘 )2

𝑟
returned as a non-resalable item. The term 𝑠 1+𝑟𝑘
assures the salvaging of items that end up
𝑟

being resalable returns after the end of the selling season if the system experience no crosschannel returns. In the second term, a portion of 𝑣 from 𝐷𝑜 is cross-returned to the physical store
and contributes negatively due to its collection cost. A portion of 𝑣(1 − 𝑘𝑜𝑟 ) from 𝐷𝑜 is salvaged
𝑘

𝑟𝑘

𝑜𝑟 𝑟
and contributes positively as it is cross-returned as a non-resalable item. The term 𝑠 1+𝑟𝑘
𝑟

considers the increment in salvaged resalable returns at the physical store when the system
experience cross-channel returns. The third term is the ordering cost for the items assigned to the
physical store.
The total supply chain profit function can be modeled as:
(𝑤𝑘 )2

𝑜
𝜋 = 𝜋𝑜𝑐 + 𝜋𝑟𝑐 = 𝐷𝑜 [(1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣)𝑝𝑜 − 𝑡 − 𝑤(𝑑 + 𝑡) + 𝑤(1 − 𝑘𝑜 )𝑠 + 𝑠 1+𝑤𝑘
− 𝑣𝑑 +
𝑜

𝑘

(𝑟𝑘 )2

𝑟𝑘

𝑜𝑟 𝑟
𝑟
𝑣(1 − 𝑘𝑜𝑟 )𝑠 + 𝑣𝑠 1+𝑟𝑘
] + 𝐷𝑟 [(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑟 − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟(1 − 𝑘𝑟 )𝑠 + 𝑠 1+𝑟𝑘
] − 𝑄𝑜 𝑐 − 𝑄𝑟 𝑐. (5)
𝑟

𝑟
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By replacing the quantity 𝑄𝑜 with its function (1) and the quantity 𝑄𝑟 with its function (2), the
total supply chain profit can be transformed into the following:
𝜋 = 𝐷𝑜 [(1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣)𝑝𝑜 − 𝑡 − 𝑤(𝑑 + 𝑡) + 𝑤(1 − 𝑘𝑜 )𝑠 +
𝑘𝑜𝑟 (𝑐+𝑠(𝑟𝑘𝑟 )2 )
1+𝑟𝑘𝑟

)] + 𝐷𝑟 [(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑟 − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟(1 − 𝑘𝑟 )𝑠 +

𝑠(𝑤𝑘𝑜 )2 −𝑐
1+𝑤𝑘𝑜

𝑠(𝑟𝑘𝑟 )2 −𝑐
1+𝑟𝑘𝑟

+ 𝑣 ((1 − 𝑘𝑜𝑟 )𝑠 − 𝑑 +

].

(6)

One may reformulate the profit function (6) as the following:
𝜋 = 𝐷𝑜 [𝐽𝑝𝑜 − 𝐵 ] + 𝐷𝑟 [𝐼𝑝𝑟 − 𝐴] = 𝐷𝑜 [𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑜𝑐 ] + 𝐷𝑟 [𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑟𝑐 ]

(7)

Where;
𝐼 = 1 − 𝑟 > 0, 𝐽 = 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 > 0, 𝐴 = 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟(1 − 𝑘𝑟 )𝑠 −
𝐵 = 𝑡 + 𝑤(𝑑 + 𝑡) − 𝑤(1 − 𝑘𝑜 )𝑠 −

𝑠(𝑤𝑘𝑜 )2 −𝑐
1+𝑤𝑘𝑜

𝑠(𝑟𝑘𝑟 )2 −𝑐
1+𝑟𝑘𝑟

, and

− 𝑣 ((1 − 𝑘𝑜𝑟 )𝑠 − 𝑑 +

𝑘𝑜𝑟 (𝑐+𝑠(𝑟𝑘𝑟 )2 )
1+𝑟𝑘𝑟

).

Notice that 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑜𝑐 and 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑟𝑐 is the revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from the online
store and physical store, respectively. Thus, the optimal solution is subjected to the following
constraints:
𝐷𝑜 ≥ 0, 𝐷𝑟 ≥ 0, [𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑜𝑐 ] ≥ 0, [𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑟𝑐 ] ≥ 0, and 𝑄𝑟 ≥ 0.
Section 4.1 presents an analysis of a situation wherein a central decision maker adopts a
differential pricing strategy or does not add any constraint to prices. Section 4.2 studies a
situation wherein a central decision maker adopts a unified pricing strategy or constrains prices
so that they are equal.
4.1

DCRS under the Differential Pricing Strategy
It has been argued that differential pricing is the optimal strategy when higher prices are

assigned to the channel with the highest operational costs (Zhang et al. 2010 and Yan 2008).
Neslin et al. (2006) have also argued in favour of differential pricing, but with higher prices
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assigned to the channel with the lowest price-sensitive customers. However, several other
authors have argued that a unified pricing strategy is not optimal for a DCR and that a channel’s
pricing strategy should be proportional to its customer’s preference and its provided services
(Chen, Zhang and Sun 2012; Dan, Xu and Liu 2012; Hua, Wang and Cheng 2010). Thus, this
section investigates the effect customer preference and rates of return have on pricing policies
when a sole DCR’s manager chooses to run its enterprise using the differential pricing strategy.
Proposition 1: Under the differential pricing strategy, the profit function 𝜋 is strictly and jointly
concave in 𝑝𝑜 and 𝑝𝑟 , given that 4𝛽 2 𝐼𝐽 > 𝛾 2 (𝐼 + 𝐽)2 . The system will perform at its best with the
physical store’s optimal price of 𝑝𝐶∗𝑟 and the online store’s optimal price of 𝑝𝐶∗𝑜 :
𝑝𝐶∗𝑟 =
𝑝𝐶∗𝑜 =

(𝛾𝐽𝛼𝑜 −𝛾2 𝐴)(𝐼+𝐽)+𝛾𝛽𝐵(𝐼−𝐽 )+2𝐽(𝛽𝐼𝛼𝑟 +𝛽 2 𝐴)

, and

(8)

.

(9)

4𝐽𝐼𝛽 2 −𝛾2 (𝐼+𝐽)2
(𝛾𝐼𝛼𝑟 −𝛾2 𝐵)(𝐼+𝐽)−𝛾𝛽𝐴(𝐼−𝐽)+2𝐼(𝛽𝐽𝛼𝑜 +𝛽 2 𝐵)
4𝐽𝐼𝛽 2 −𝛾2 (𝐼+𝐽)2

Proof: By substituting sales functions into (7), one may construct the Hussein matrix for the
profit function as the following:

𝐻𝐶 = [

𝜕2 𝜋

𝜕2 𝜋

𝜕𝑝𝑟2
𝜕2 𝜋

𝜕𝑝𝑟 𝑝𝑜

𝜕𝑝𝑜 𝑝𝑟

𝜕𝑝𝑜2

𝜕2 𝜋

]=[

−2𝛽𝐼
𝛾(𝐼 + 𝐽)
].
𝛾(𝐼 + 𝐽)
−2𝛽𝐽

𝜕2 𝜋

Since 𝜕𝑝2 < 0, the profit function is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝𝑜 and 𝑝𝑟 given that |𝐻𝐶 | > 0
𝑟

or 4𝛽 2 𝐼𝐽 > 𝛾 2 (𝐼 + 𝐽)2 . Intuitively, 𝑝𝐶∗𝑟 and 𝑝𝐶∗𝑜 can be found by simultaneously solving the firstorder conditions

𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝑟

= 0 and

𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝑜

= 0. □

From Proposition 1, one may guarantee the existence of a unique optimal set of prices if
the stated condition is satisfied. However, this condition may not be satisfied if 𝛾 is very close to
𝛽 and the total return rate of a channel is much higher than what it is for the other channel. Those

18

cases are less likely to occur since 𝛾 is expected to be much less than 𝛽. Also, a channel with
excessive total return rate will, most likely, be eliminated or its return policy will, at least, be
changed.
If we differentiate the optimal prices with respect to 𝜃 we get
∗
𝜕𝑝𝐶
𝑜

𝜕𝜃

𝛼𝐼(2𝛽𝐽−𝛾(𝐼+𝐽))

∗
𝜕𝑝𝐶
𝑟

= − 4𝐽𝐼𝛽2 −𝛾2 (𝐼+𝐽)2 , and |

𝜕𝜃

∗
𝜕𝑝𝐶
𝑜

|−|

𝜕𝜃

∗
𝜕𝑝𝐶
𝑟

𝜕𝜃

𝛼𝐽(2𝛽𝐼−𝛾(𝐼+𝐽))

= 4𝐽𝐼𝛽2 −𝛾2 (𝐼+𝐽)2 ,

𝛼𝛾(𝐼+𝐽)(𝐼−𝐽)

| = 4𝐽𝐼𝛽2 −𝛾2(𝐼+𝐽)2. It shows that the optimal price for

a certain channel will not always increase as customers’ preference for that channel increases
with customer returns. It could instead increase or decrease depending on the signs 2𝛽𝐼 −
𝛾(𝐼 + 𝐽) and 2𝛽𝐽 − 𝛾(𝐼 + 𝐽) for the physical store and the online store, respectively. That is,
managers should not assume that higher customer preference for a certain channel drives prices
in that channel up; they must first consider customer returns. The result for DCR with return is
different from the previous observations on pricing strategies for DCR without returns: a higher
base level of demand in a single sale channel leads to a higher selling price if customer returns
are not considered (Dan, Xu and Liu 2012 and Hua, Wang and Cheng 2010). Also, as 𝜃
increases, the online store is found to have a higher corresponding rate of change in its optimal
price than the physical store if 𝑤 + 𝑣 < 𝑟, an identical rate if 𝑤 + 𝑣 = 𝑟, and a lower rate if 𝑤 +
𝑣 > 𝑟. If 𝜃 = 𝜃̅ and 0 ≤ 𝜃̅ ≤ 1, then it is optimal for both channels to have a similar pricing
strategy, i.e. 𝑝𝐶∗𝑟 = 𝑝𝐶∗𝑜 , where
2

𝛼𝐽(2𝛽𝐽−𝛾(𝐼+𝐽))−𝛾𝛽(𝐼−𝐽)(𝐴+𝐵)+2𝛽 (𝐼𝐵−𝐽𝐴)+𝛾
𝜃̅ =
𝛼(4𝛽𝐼𝐽−𝛾(𝐼+𝐽)2 )

2 (𝐼+𝐽)(𝐴−𝐵)

.

(10)

∗

∗

𝜕𝑝𝐶
𝜕𝑝
Note that 𝜃̅ will mostly lie out of range if 𝜕𝜃𝐶𝑟 and 𝜕𝜃𝑜 are either positive or negative. One may

observe that customer preference for a certain channel has a significant impact on the optimal
prices of channels.
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4.2

DCRS under the Unified Pricing Strategy
Webb and Lambe (2007) have stated that pricing strategy causes most of the conflicts

that arise between channels. In addition, several authors have stated that one may avoid customer
confusion and retain a business’s image by using a unified price across all channels (Neslin and
Shankar 2009; Webb and Lambe 2007; Berman and Thelen 2004). Consequently, 80% of all
multichannel retailers choose to unify their pricing strategies across all channels (Ofek, Katona
and Sarvary 2009). Thus, this section investigates the effect that customer preference and rates of
return have on pricing policies when a sole DCR’s manager choses to run the enterprise with a
unified pricing strategy. Due to the added constraint (i.e., 𝑝𝑟 = 𝑝𝑜 = 𝑝), it is trivial that the profit
generated by the unified pricing strategy is less than or equal to the profit generated by the
differential pricing strategy.
Proposition 2: Under the unified pricing strategy, the profit function 𝜋 is strictly concave in 𝑝.
Thus, there a unique optimal solution of 𝑝𝑈∗ exists that derives the optimal profit 𝜋𝑈∗ :
1 (𝛽−𝛾)(𝐴+𝐵)+𝛼𝑜 𝐽+𝛼𝑟 𝐼
).
(𝛽−𝛾)(𝐽+𝐼)

𝑝𝑈∗ = 2 (

(11)

Proof: By substituting sales functions into (7) and constraining prices to be equivalent, i.e. 𝑝𝑟 =
𝑝𝑜 = 𝑝, one may find that

𝜕2 𝜋
𝜕𝑝2

= −2(𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝐼 + 𝐽) < 0. Thus, the profit function is strictly

concave in 𝑝. The optimal unified price can be calculated by solving the first-order condition
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝

= 0. □
From Proposition 2, one may differentiate the optimal unified price with respect to 𝜃 to

get

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑈

𝜕𝜃

𝛼

𝐼−𝐽

= 2 ((𝛽−𝛾)(𝐽+𝐼)). Thus, the optimal price will increase as 𝜃 increases under the condition

𝑟 < 𝑣 + 𝑤, and will decrease as 𝜃 increases under the condition 𝑟 > 𝑣 + 𝑤. Intuitively, the
change in 𝜃 has no effect on the DCR’s pricing strategy when 𝑟 = 𝑣 + 𝑤. One may notice that
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the decision to increase or decrease the unified price solely depends on the values 𝑟, 𝑣, and 𝑤.
This places an emphasis on customer returns when one selects pricing policies for dual-channel
retailing systems.
5.

DECENTRALIZED DUAL-CHANNEL RETAILING SYSTEM
According to Zhang et al. (2010), “most retail corporations manage their channels in a

decentralized fashion and many of them maintain separate teams of inventory management.”
Falk et al. (2007) claim that integration may not be optimal if it is associated with a high
implementation cost. As previously stated, a failure to centralize or integrate a DCR will trigger
price and service competition that is normally initiated by cannibalization. Notice that a crosschannel return policy allows online stores to increase both sales and customer satisfaction and
allows physical stores to create cross-selling opportunities. Assume that 𝑐̂ is the amount a
physical store pays to an online store for every cross-channel return. If 𝑐̂ is constructed fairly,
then it is of all channels’ best interest to accept such a return policy. Thus, there is no
contradiction between having a cross-channel return as an accepted practice and the fact that
competition takes place between channels.
The performance of the competing channels is studied using two sequential games,
namely the Online-Leader Stackelberge game, discussed in Section 5.1, and the Physical-Leader
Stackelberge game, discussed in Section 5.2, and one simultaneous game, namely the Nash
game, discussed in Section 5.3. Yan et al. (2010), Yan (2010), and Yan (2008) have stated that
Target, Nike, and Kohl’s are all good candidates for Stackelberge competition. They have also
stated that a Stackelberge game always outperform a Nash game. Similarly, Lu and Liu (2013)
have argued that a Stackelberge game influences the profitability of channels more effectively
than a Nash game. In a competitive environment, each channel forms its own decision in
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isolation to maximize its individual profit. One may assume that all sales function parameters,
return rates, cost parameters, and decision rules are known to both competitors.
Due to decentralization, the profit functions below are constructed in a manner similar to
formulas (3) to (7), with the exception that 𝑐̂ is included in the formulation.
𝜋𝑜 = 𝐷𝑜 [(1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣)𝑝𝑜 − 𝑡 − 𝑤(𝑑 + 𝑡) + 𝑤(1 − 𝑘𝑜 )𝑠 + 𝑣𝑐̂ +
𝜋𝑟 = 𝐷𝑟 [(1 − 𝑟)𝑝𝑟 − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟(1 − 𝑘𝑟 )𝑠 +

𝑠(𝑟𝑘𝑟 )2 −𝑐
1+𝑟𝑘𝑟

] + 𝑣𝐷𝑜 [

𝑠(𝑤𝑘𝑜 )2 −𝑐
1+𝑤𝑘𝑜

𝑘𝑜𝑟 (𝑐+𝑠𝑟𝑘𝑟 )
1+𝑟𝑘𝑟

]

(12)

+ (1 − 𝑘𝑜𝑟 )𝑠 − 𝑐̂ − 𝑑]
(13)

One may reformulate the profit functions (12) and (13) respectively as the following:
𝜋𝑜 = 𝐷𝑜 [𝐽𝑝𝑜 − 𝐺] = 𝐷𝑜 [𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑜𝑑 ]

(14)

𝜋𝑟 = 𝐷𝑟 [𝐼𝑝𝑟 − 𝐴] + 𝑣𝐷𝑜 𝐹 = 𝐷𝑟 [𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑟𝑑 ] + 𝑣𝐷𝑜 𝐹

(15)

Where;
𝐺 = 𝑡 + 𝑤(𝑑 + 𝑡) − 𝑤(1 − 𝑘𝑜 )𝑠 − 𝑣𝑐̂ −

𝑠(𝑤𝑘𝑜 )2 −𝑐
1+𝑤𝑘𝑜

, and 𝐹 =

𝑘𝑜𝑟 (𝑐+𝑠𝑟𝑘𝑟 )
1+𝑟𝑘𝑟

+ (1 − 𝑘𝑜𝑟 )𝑠 − 𝑐̂ − 𝑑.

𝐹 represents the savings or losses the physical store makes by accepting each cross-channel
return. One may subject the optimal solution to the following constraints:
𝐷𝑜 ≥ 0, 𝐷𝑟 ≥ 0, [𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑜𝑑 ] ≥ 0, [𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑟𝑑 ] ≥ 0, and 𝑄𝑟 ≥ 0.
Since each channel aims to maximize it own profit in the competitive setting, the online
store may over estimate the value of cross-channel returns 𝑐̂ . In return, the physical store may
stop cooperating with the online store. Such a lack of cooperation may create havoc to the
system and cause unnecessary practices such as returning all cross-channel returns back to the
online store. Therefore, the following condition on the value of 𝑐̂ should be satisfied:
𝑘

𝑐

𝑜𝑟
𝑐̂ ≤ 1+𝑟𝑘
+
𝑟

𝑘𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑟𝑘𝑟
1+𝑟𝑘𝑟

+ (1 − 𝑘𝑜𝑟 )𝑠 − 𝑑
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The right-hand side of the above relationship represents how a physical store should consider a
cross-channel return. The first term denotes the physical store’s valuation of a resalable crosschannel return. Since an item purchased by the physical store at the beginning of the selling
season can satisfy (1 + 𝑟𝑘𝑟 ) sales, it is worth a value of 𝑐. In contradistinction, since a resalable
cross-channel return can only satisfy one sale it is worth a value of

𝑐
1+𝑟𝑘𝑟

. The second term

calculates the increase in salvaged resalable returns at the end of the selling season caused by
each resalable cross-channel return. The third term denotes the physical store’s gain, due to
salvaging, from a non-resalable cross-channel return. The fourth term denotes the physical
store’s loss, due to the collection cost, from each cross-channel return.
5.1

DCRS under the Online-Leader Stackelberge Game (OLSG)
In contrast to the physical store, forming a customer base for the online store is not

limited to the store’s neighbourhood. Also, due to the advancement in cellular phones and IT,
customers of a DCR may always check the prices of an online store before they conduct their
purchases from a physical store. Additionally, online stores are normally considered to be the
distribution centers of enterprises. Therefore, they can start the selling season before their
competitors. For the aforementioned facts, the online store is considered to have more price
influence on customers compared to the physical store. Thus, a retailer’s online store will lead
and its physical store will follow. In this game, the physical store optimizes its performance
based on the online store’s optimal price. The online store optimizes its performance based on
the physical store’s best response function.
Proposition 3: The physical store price of 𝑝𝑂 ∗𝑟 and the online store price of 𝑝𝑂∗ 𝑜 form the sole
equilibrium solution for the Online-Leader Stackelberge Game:
1 𝛼

𝐴

𝑝𝑂 ∗𝑟 (𝑝𝑜 ) = 2 ( 𝛽𝑟 + 𝐼 +

𝐹𝑣𝛾
𝛽𝐼

𝛾

+ 𝛽 𝑝𝑜 )

(16)
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𝐺

𝛼 𝛽

𝛼 𝛾

𝑣𝛾2 𝐹

𝐴𝛽𝛾

𝑝𝑂∗ 𝑜 = 2𝐽 + (2𝛽2𝑜−𝛾2) + 2(2𝛽2𝑟 −𝛾2 ) + 2𝐼(2𝛽2 −𝛾2 ) + 2𝐼(2𝛽2 −𝛾2).

(17)

Proof: Substitute sales functions into (14) and (15). Since

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑟2

= −2𝛽𝐼 < 0, then the physical

store’s profit function (𝜋𝑟 ) is strictly concave in 𝑝𝑟 . Thus, given the online store’s price (𝑝𝑜 ), the
𝜕𝜋

physical store’s optimal price of 𝑝𝑂 ∗𝑟 (𝑝𝑜 ) can be found by solving the first-order condition 𝜕𝑝𝑟 =
𝑟

0. Substitute 𝑝𝑂 ∗𝑟 (𝑝𝑜 ) into Eq. (14). Since 𝛽 ≥ 𝛾, then

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑜
𝜕𝑝𝑜2

=

𝐽(𝛾2 −2𝛽2 )
𝛽

is strictly negative. That

is to say, given the physical store’s best response function, the online store’s profit function (𝜋𝑜 )
is strictly concave in 𝑝𝑜 . This guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium for the OLSG. To
find the online store’s optimal price of 𝑝𝑂 ∗𝑜 the first-order condition

𝜕𝜋𝑜
𝜕𝑝𝑜

= 0 is solved. One may

substitute 𝑝𝑂 ∗𝑜 into Eq. (16) to get 𝑝𝑂 ∗𝑟 . The physical store and the online store equilibrium profits
are denoted by 𝜋𝑂∗ 𝑟 and 𝜋𝑂∗ 𝑜 , respectively. □
If follows from Proposition 3 that by differentiating the equilibrium prices with respect to
𝜃 one may get:
𝛼𝛾2
4𝛽(2𝛽 2 −𝛾2 )

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑂
𝑜

𝜕𝜃

𝛼

2𝛽−𝛾

= − 2 (2𝛽2 −𝛾2) < 0,

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑂
𝑟

𝜕𝜃

𝛼

= 4𝛽 (

4𝛽 2 −2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2
2𝛽 2 −𝛾2

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑂
𝑜

) > 0, and |

𝜕𝜃

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑂
𝑟

|−|

𝜕𝜃

|=

> 0. The aforementioned relationships indicate that a physical store’s optimal price

will increase as 𝜃 increases, while an online store’s optimal price will decrease as 𝜃 increases.
The follower’s (physical store’s) pricing strategy is always less affected by the change in 𝜃 than
the leader’s (online store’s) pricing strategy. Also,

𝜕𝑝𝑂 ∗𝑟 (𝑝𝑜 )
𝜕𝑝𝑜

𝛾

= 2𝛽 > 0 or if the online store’s best

response increases by a single unit, then the physical store’s best response will increase by half a
unit at the most. Dan, Xu and Liu (2012) came to a similar conclusion for a dual-channel system
without customer returns. This in fact shows how much control the leader has over the follower.
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5.2

DCRS under the Physical-Leader Stackelberge Game (PLSG)
Similar to Yan et al. (2010) and Yan (2008), this section models a game wherein a

physical store is the price leader due to its prevailing market power. Thus, the online store
optimizes its performance based on the physical store’s optimal price, while the physical store
optimizes its performance based on the online store’s best response function.
Proposition 4: The physical store price of 𝑝𝑅 ∗𝑟 and the online store price of 𝑝𝑅∗ 𝑜 form a unique
equilibrium solution for the Physical-Leader Stackelberge Game:
1 𝛼

𝐺

𝛾

𝑝𝑅 ∗𝑜 (𝑝𝑟 ) = 2 ( 𝛽𝑜 + 𝐽 + 𝛽 𝑝𝑟 )
𝐴

𝛼 𝛽

𝛾𝛼

(18)
𝐺𝛽𝛾

𝛽𝑣𝛾𝐹

𝑜
𝑝𝑅 ∗𝑟 = 2𝐼 + (2𝛽2𝑟−𝛾2) + 2(2𝛽2 −𝛾
2 ) + 2𝐽(2𝛽 2 −𝛾 2 ) + 2𝐼(2𝛽 2 −𝛾2 ).

Proof: Since

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑜
𝜕𝑝𝑜2

(19)

= −2𝛽𝐽 < 0, then the online store’s profit function (𝜋𝑜 ) is strictly concave in

𝑝𝑜 . Thus, given the physical store’s price (𝑝𝑟 ), the online store’s optimal price of 𝑝𝑅 ∗𝑜 (𝑝𝑟 ) can be
found by solving the first-order condition
𝛾, then

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑟2

=

𝐼(𝛾2 −2𝛽 2 )
𝛽

𝜕𝜋𝑜
𝜕𝑝𝑜

= 0. Substitute 𝑝𝑅 ∗𝑜 (𝑝𝑟 ) into Eq. (15). Since 𝛽 ≥

is strictly negative. Thus, given the online store’s best response function,

the physical store’s profit function (𝜋𝑟 ) is strictly concave in 𝑝𝑟 . This guarantees the existence of
a unique equilibrium for the PLSG. To find the physical store’s optimal price of 𝑝𝑅 ∗𝑟 the firstorder condition

𝜕𝜋𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑟

= 0 is solved. One may substitute 𝑝𝑅 ∗𝑟 into Eq. (18) to get 𝑝𝑅 ∗𝑜 . The physical

store and the online store equilibrium profits are denoted by 𝜋𝑅∗ 𝑟 and 𝜋𝑅∗ 𝑜 , respectively. □
If follows from Proposition 4 that by differentiating the equilibrium prices with respect to
𝜃 one get:
𝛼𝛾2
4𝛽(2𝛽 2 −𝛾2 )

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑅
𝑟

𝜕𝜃

𝛼

2𝛽−𝛾

= 2 (2𝛽2 −𝛾2) > 0,

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑅
𝑜

𝜕𝜃

𝛼

4𝛽 2 −2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2

= − 4𝛽 (

2𝛽 2 −𝛾2

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑅
𝑟

) < 0, and |

𝜕𝜃

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑅
𝑜

|−|

𝜕𝜃

|=

> 0. The previous relationships indicate that a physical store’s optimal price will
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increase as 𝜃 increases, while an online store’s optimal price will decrease as 𝜃 increases. Notice
that the leaders in both Stackelberge games have the same rate of change. Similarly, the
followers in both Stackelberge games have the same rate of change. Consequently, the follower’s
(online store’s) pricing strategy is always less affected by the change in 𝜃 than the leader’s
(physical store’s) pricing strategy. Also,

∗ (𝑝 )
𝜕𝑝𝑅
𝑜 𝑟

𝜕𝑝𝑟

𝛾

= 2𝛽 > 0 or if the physical store’s best response

increases by a single unit, then the online store’s best response will increase by half a unit at the
most.
5.3

DCRS under the Nash Game
In a dual-channel Nash game, online and physical stores are equally powerful. The

market has no price leader. Thus, prices are selected simultaneously in both channels. In this
game, each store optimizes its performance given the rival’s price.
Proposition 5: A unique Nash equilibrium exists under the physical store’s price, 𝑝𝑁∗ 𝑟 , and the
online store’s price, 𝑝𝑁∗ 𝑜 :
1

𝑝𝑁∗ 𝑟 = (4𝛽2 −𝛾2) (2𝛽𝛼𝑟 + 𝛾𝛼𝑜 +
1

𝑝𝑁∗ 𝑜 = (4𝛽2 −𝛾2 ) (2𝛽𝛼𝑜 + 𝛾𝛼𝑟 +

4𝛽 3 𝐺
𝐽𝛾
2𝛽 2 𝐺
𝐽

+
+

2𝛽 2 𝐴
𝐼
𝛽𝛾𝐴
𝐼

+

+

2𝑣𝛽𝛾𝐹
𝐼

𝑣𝛾2 𝐹
𝐼

)−

𝛽𝐺
𝐽𝛾

).

(20)
(21)

Proof: The Game’s Hussein matrix is formed as the following:
𝜕 2 𝜋𝑟

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑟

𝜕𝑝𝑟2
𝜕2 𝜋𝑜

𝜕𝑝𝑟 𝜕𝑝𝑜

𝜕𝑝𝑜 𝜕𝑝𝑟

𝜕𝑝𝑜2

𝐻𝑁 = [

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑜

]=[

−2𝐼𝛽
𝐽𝛾

𝐼𝛾
].
−2𝐽𝛽

Notice that each player’s profit function is concave on the player’s own decision variable, i.e.
𝜕 2 𝜋𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑟2

= −2𝐼𝛽 < 0 and

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑜
𝜕𝑝𝑜2

= −2𝐽𝛽 < 0. Also, the determinant for the Hussein matrix is strictly

positive, i.e. |𝐻𝑁 | = 𝐼𝐽(4𝛽 2 − 𝛾 2 ) > 0. Therefore, there exist a unique Nash equilibrium.
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Consequently, given the competitor’s price, a channel can find its own pricing strategy by
solving the first-order condition as follows:
𝜕𝜋

from 𝜕𝑝𝑟 = 0 we have 𝑝𝑟 (𝑝𝑜 ) =

𝛽𝐴+𝐼𝛼𝑟 +𝑣𝛾𝐹+𝐼𝛾𝑝𝑜
2𝛽𝐼

𝑟

𝜕𝜋

from 𝜕𝑝𝑜 = 0 we have 𝑝𝑜 (𝑝𝑟 ) =

𝛽𝐺+𝐽𝛼𝑜 +𝐽𝛾𝑝𝑟
2𝛽𝐽

𝑜

, and

.

By solving the above system of equations simultaneously, one may find the physical store’s and
the online store’s equilibrium prices. The physical store and the online store equilibrium profits
are denoted by 𝜋𝑁∗ 𝑟 and 𝜋𝑁∗ 𝑜 , respectively. □
In response to Proposition 5, one may test the reaction of equilibrium prices when 𝜃
changes. Thus, the following differentiations are taken:
𝛾𝛼−2𝛽(𝛼−1)
4𝛽 2 −𝛾2

. Since (𝛼 − 1) ≈ 𝛼, then

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑁
𝑟

𝜕𝜃

≈

𝛼(2𝛽−𝛾)
4𝛽 2 −𝛾2

> 0 and

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑁
𝑟

𝜕𝜃
∗
𝜕𝑝𝑁
𝑜

𝜕𝜃

=
≈

2𝛽𝛼−𝛾(𝛼−1)
4𝛽 2 −𝛾2
−𝛼(2𝛽−𝛾)
4𝛽 2 −𝛾2

and

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑁
𝑜

𝜕𝜃

=

< 0. Thus, the

physical store’s optimal price will increase and the online store’s optimal price will decrease as 𝜃
∗
𝜕𝑝𝑁
𝑟

increases. Similar to the PLSG, |

𝜕𝜃

∗
𝜕𝑝𝑁
𝑜

|−|

𝜕𝜃

|=

(2𝛼−1)(2𝛽−𝛾)
4𝛽 2 −𝛾2

> 0 or the online store’s pricing

strategy is less affected by the change in 𝜃 than the physical store’s pricing strategy. Due to
functions complexity, it is difficult to carry on a comparison between a channel’s price and
profitability under the different games. Thus, the comparison is done in the sensitivity analysis.
Lemma 1: In each competition scheme, there exists a threshold such that if 𝜃 is equivalent to
that threshold, then the equilibrium prices are set equally.
Proof:
If 𝜃 = 𝜃̌ in the OLSG, then 𝑝𝑂∗ 𝑜 = 𝑝𝑂∗ 𝑟 ; where
2

2

2𝛽(2𝛽 −𝛾 )
𝐺
𝐴
𝐺𝛾
4𝐼𝛽𝛼+2𝐴𝛽𝛾−2𝐼𝛼𝛾−𝐴𝛾
𝜃̌ = 𝛼(8𝛽2 −𝛾2 −4𝛽𝛾) ( 𝐽 − 𝐼 − 2𝐽𝛽 +
2𝐼(2𝛽 2 −𝛾2 )

If 𝜃 = 𝜃̆ in the PLSG, then 𝑝𝑅∗ 𝑜 = 𝑝𝑅∗ 𝑟 ; where
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2 +2𝑣𝛾 2 𝐹

𝑣𝛾3 𝐹

− 2𝛽𝐼(2𝛽2 −𝛾2) −

𝐹𝑣𝛾
𝛽𝐼

).

(22)

2

2

(2𝛽−𝛾)
(2𝛽 −𝛾 )
2𝐺𝛽
2𝐴𝛽
𝐴𝛾
𝐺𝛽𝛾
𝛽𝑣𝛾𝐹
𝜃̆ = (2 + 𝐽𝛼 − 𝐼𝛼 + 𝐼𝛼 ) 2(2𝛽2 −𝛾2)+(2𝛽−𝛾)2 − (𝛾 + 𝐽𝛼 + 𝐼𝛼 ) 2(2𝛽2 −𝛾2 )+(2𝛽−𝛾)2 .

(23)

If 𝜃 = 𝜃̃ in the Nash game, then 𝑝𝑁∗ 𝑟 = 𝑝𝑁∗ 𝑜 ; where
1
𝛽𝐺
𝛽𝐴
𝑣𝛾𝐹
𝜃̃ = 2𝛼 (𝛼 + 𝐽 − 𝐼 − 𝐼 ). □

(24)

A similar outcome can be found in the studies conducted by Dan, Xu and Liu (2012),
Chen, Zhang and Sun (2012), and Hua, Wang and Cheng (2010). It follows from Lemma 1 that
if customer preference for the physical store is lower than the threshold, then the selling price in
the physical store is lower than the selling price in the online store. If customer preference for the
physical store is higher than the threshold, then the selling price in the physical store is higher
than the selling price in the online store. For example, when remanufactured or used items are
offered for sale, customers are most likely eager to verify the quality of the offered items before
completing a purchase. Thus higher prices should be offered in the physical store. While
changing the 𝜃 value may impose a different outcome on the decentralized setting than on the
centralized setting, in both cases it significantly impacts pricing decisions.
6.

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
This numerical study aims to provide several key managerial insights by answering the

following questions: Does a unified pricing strategy under centralized management have a higher
total profit than competing dual channels? If not, under what conditions is this statement not
correct? The latter’s answer leads to the following question: Under what competition setting and
conditions is the total performance best? How does a channel’s pricing strategy compare to
different cases? This study uses the following parameters:
𝑐̂ =

𝑘𝑜𝑟 (𝑐+𝑠𝑟𝑘𝑟 )
1+𝑟𝑘𝑟

+ (1 − 𝑘𝑜𝑟 )𝑠 − 𝑑, 𝑐 = 30, 𝑠 = 10, 𝑑 = 2, 𝑡 = 4, 𝑟 = 0.2, 𝑤 = 0.2, 𝑣 = 0.2,

𝑘𝑟 = 0.6, 𝑘𝑜 = 0.4, 𝑘𝑜𝑟 = 0.4, 𝜃 = {0.45,0.65}, 𝛾 = 5, 𝛽 = 10 and, 𝛼 = 15𝑘.
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6.1

Total System Performance under Unified-Pricing Strategy and Competition
If the centralization process eliminates conflict by including the unification of selling

prices across all channels (Yan 2010), then an enterprise may be better off with uncoordinated
channels. As presented in Figure 2a, when customer preference for the physical store, 𝜃, and the
physical store’s rate of return, 𝑟, are sufficiently high, competition between channels leads to a
better total supply chain performance. Similarly, when customer preference for the online
channel, 1 − 𝜃, and the online store’s same-channel rate of return, 𝑤, are sufficiently high, an
enterprise should encourage competition rather than coordination (Figure 2b). Indeed, embracing
a sole price will reduce channel conflict but deprive the system of agility. That is, it is difficult
for an enterprise to divert sales from a high return-rate channel to a low return-rate channel. It
should be noted that centralization with a differential pricing strategy has not been considered in
this section. Similar to Yan’s 2008 and 2010 findings and Yan et al.’s 2010 findings, such a
setting will lead to the best system performance for all applicable parameters, especially when
coordination cost is not considered.
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Figure 2: Total profit comparisons between centralization and decentralization with unified
pricing scheme
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6.2

System's Performance and Pricing Strategy under Competition Schemes
This section will compare the various Stackelberge games before addressing some

features of the Nash game. In the sequential competitions, if customer preference for a physical
store is high, then the total SC performs best under PLSG. If customer preference for an online
store is high, then the total SC performs best in the OLSG (Figure 3a). Thus, a dual-channel
system will have a higher chance of profitability when the channel with the highest customer
preference leads. Cai, Zhang and Zhang (2009) came to a similar result and called it the
“Stackelberge leadership dilemma.” Notice that this result is true when the rates of return are not
considered or low.
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Figure 3: Comparison of total profit under different competition schemes
If 𝑟 is not low, then the total SC generates more profit in a PLSG than in an OLSG, even
if customer preference for an online store is high (Figure 3b). Indeed, when 𝑟 increases, the
necessity to switch sales from the retailer’s physical store to its online store is higher. Since
𝑝𝑅 ∗𝑟 ≥ 𝑝𝑂 ∗𝑟 and 𝑝𝑂 ∗𝑜 ≥ 𝑝𝑅 ∗𝑜 are true at all times (Figure 4), then the physical store satisfies less
sales and the online store satisfies more sales when in the PLSG than when in the OLSG. To
elucidate, a physical store’s manager sets prices depending on online store prices when the latter
is the leader. Thus, the manager is distracted by the price competition and does not tackle the
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issue of returns. However, one of his or her main concerns is to reduce the effect that returns
have when he or she sets the price first in a PLSG.
Similarly, an online store will satisfy less sales and a physical store will satisfy more
sales when in an OLSG than when in a PLSG. As 𝑣 or 𝑤 increase, there is a higher need to
switch sales from the online store to the physical store. Therefore, if 𝑣 or 𝑤 is not low, then the
dual channel generates more profit in an OLSG than in a PLSG -- even if customer preference
for the physical store is high (figures omitted due to similar responses).
Similar to the findings of Yan et al. (2010), Yan (2010), and Yan (2008), the
Stackelberge competition always has better channels' profits and thus system performance than
the Nash competition (Figure 3). In general, the difference in a channel’s profitability under a
Stackelberge game verses a Nash game, i.e. 𝜋𝑂∗ 𝑟 − 𝜋𝑁∗ 𝑟 , 𝜋𝑅∗ 𝑟 − 𝜋𝑁∗ 𝑟 , 𝜋𝑂∗ 𝑜 − 𝜋𝑁∗ 𝑜 , and 𝜋𝑅∗ 𝑜 − 𝜋𝑁∗ 𝑜 ,
diminishes as any rate of return increases. However, under the OLSG and as 𝑟 increases, the
online store’s management does not get distracted by price competition and the channel is not
increasingly troubled with returns. Consequently, the difference 𝜋𝑂∗ 𝑜 − 𝜋𝑁∗ 𝑜 is enhanced.
Similarly, under the PLSG and as 𝑤 or 𝑣 increases, the physical store’s management does not get
distracted by price competition and the channel is not increasingly troubled with returns.
Consequently, the difference 𝜋𝑅∗ 𝑟 − 𝜋𝑁∗ 𝑟 is enhanced.
Comparable to the outcomes of Yan et al. (2010), Yan (2010), and Yan (2008) where
customer returns were not considered in their analysis, the Stackelberge competition induces
higher equilibrium prices compared to Nash competition (Figure 4). This finding is intuitive,
since Stackelberge game imposes a higher coordination level between channels. Additionally,
both channels are equally powerful in the Nash game. This implies that there will be increased
price competition. This provides an explanation for why the channels prices in a Nash game are
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always lower than the channels prices in a Stackelberge game. Thus, enterprises should always
employ the Stackelberge scheme to set channel prices in a competitive market.
According to Dan, Xu and Liu (2012) and Hua, Wang and Cheng (2010), the profit of the
physical store (follower) grows in response to the increase in the online store’s (leader’s) pricing
strategy. However, no practical justification is given for this price increment. Thus, the
aforementioned finding can be further expanded under the context of customer returns. One may
notice from Figure 4 that the increase in 𝑣 or 𝑤 forces the online store to raise its selling price in
order to diminish the negative effect of returns and encourages the physical store to increase its
selling price to capture more profit from the market. Consequently, the online store’s profit will
decrease and the physical store’s profit will increase. This is true for any competitive scheme. A
similar outcome is obtained when 𝑟 increases. Be informed that the impact a return rate has on
stores’ prices is not profound. A channel will be reluctant to dramatically increase its selling
price and lose sales in favour of the competing channel. Also, it is worth noting that 𝜃 has a
higher impact on physical store’s profitability than online store’s profitability under any
competition scheme (Yan et al. 2010). However, the aforementioned statement is further boosted
when 𝑤 or 𝑣 increases and reversed when 𝑟 increases.
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Figure 4: Return rates’ effect on physical and online store pricing strategies in competition
schemes
6.3

Pricing Strategies under Centralized Management
A comparison of Figures 4 and 5 shows that channels have higher selling prices when

coordinating rather than when decentralizing. Since the prices under the two settings are not
equal, it can be stated that decisions in a decentralized setting deviate from the overall system’s
perspective. Indeed, coordination eliminates price competition, providing a chance for both
channels to increase prices. Similarly, Yan et al. (2010) have indicated that differential prices set
by a sole manager are higher than those set by competing channels. In contrast, Ryan, Sun and
Zhao (2013) have indicated that coordination increases total supply chain profit, but at the same
time decreases the prices of both channels.
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Figure 5: Return rates’ effect on physical and online pricing strategies under centralization
schemes
Huang and Swaminathan (2009) have stated that a DCR with differential pricing strategy
may price the online channel lower than the traditional channel under the condition that it has a
higher market share. However, this study provides a different conclusion especially when
customer returns are considered. To elucidate, as 𝑤 or 𝑣 increase within the differential case, the
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online store’s price increases in an attempt to decrease the negative effect of return.
Consequently, the online store’s sales will decline. The physical store should decrease the selling
price to attract more customers and to shift part of the lost sales from the online store to the
physical store (Figure 5 c to f). Under extremely high 𝑤 and/or 𝑣, the online store can serve as an
information channel and the physical store can serve as a transaction channel. When 𝑟 increases,
channel prices are set such that sales shifts from the physical store to the online store (Figure 5 a
and b). If 𝑟 is extremely high, then the physical store can be used as a show room and most
purchases can be directed to the online store (Neslin and Shankar 2009; and Steinfield 2004).
Both channels operate in coordination to fulfill organizational-level goals rather than channellevel goals. Indeed, the compensation system in the centralized case should not depend upon the
channel’s profitability. It should instead depend upon the degree of coordination and the total
supply chain’s profitability. Comparing the above pricing strategy to that of both Stackelberge
and Nash games wherein a store has no intention of losing customers in favour of the competing
store, the findings in this section support Baal’s (2014) hypothesis that “the higher the degree of
harmonization, the greater the degree of cannibalization.”
In the case of unification, it is difficult to mitigate the customer returns problem by
shifting sales from one channel to another due to the pricing policy used. It has been found that
the unified price should decrease if the rate of return for the channel with high customer
preference increases. In contradistinction, if the rate of return for the channel with low customer
preference increases, the unified price will increase (Figure 5).
7.

MANAGERIAL INSIGHTS
This research has several implications in regards to the pricing strategies of a DCR

wherein both same- and cross-channel returns have been considered. It has examined several
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insights related to the centralization of a DCR under unified pricing or differential pricing
schemes. It has also examined insights related to the decentralization of a DCR under OnlineLeader Stackelberge, Physical-Leader Stackelberge or Nash games.
It has been found that when customer preference for the physical channel is higher than a
threshold value, then the retailer’s set price should be higher in the physical channel than in the
online channel. The threshold is defined as 𝜃̌, 𝜃̆ and 𝜃̃ in the Online-Leader Stackelberge,
Physical-Leader Stackelberge and Nash games, respectively. Such a situation may occur when
products have been custom designed or when remanufactured or used items have been offered
for sale. Consequently, customers are more likely to verify the design or quality of the offered
items before completing their purchase. However, when customer’ preference for the physical
channel is lower than the threshold value, the retailer’s set price should be lower in the physical
channel than in the online channel. Such a situation may occur when the products that have been
offered for sale do not require a high level of examination in regards to their design or quality
level before being purchased. For example, products that are standardized or mature (such as
books and CDs) better fit this category. In a centralized situation, the threshold value is defined
as 𝜃̅. Under valid, but unusual parameters, 𝜃̅ could be higher than one, which means that the
online store should always be priced higher than the physical store. Additionally, 𝜃̅ could be less
than zero, which means that the online store should always be priced lower than the physical
store.
Centralization with a differential pricing scheme may cause a retailer to significantly shift
sales from one channel to another, leaving the first channel with virtually no customers. Such a
management style imposes hardship on the retailer when it comes to tailoring a compensation
program that is fair for both channels and dependent on coordination level rather than on sales.
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As a result, many retailers centralize decision-making under a unified pricing strategy. Thus,
retailers should be aware of several important issues related to the price unification process. For
example, when under a centralized DCR and a unified price strategy, a retailer’s profit is not
always higher than when under a decentralized DCR. Thus, the retailer should be careful in
regards to encouraging or discouraging competition between channels. For example, if a channel
experiences a sufficiently high customer preference and a same-channel rate of return, then it is
better for the retailer to encourage competition rather than coordination. This could occur in the
apparel industry, for example, wherein customers are increasingly inclined to use online stores
despite having up to a 75% chance that they will return their purchases due to size or material
mismatches.
Prices in the Nash game, when neither channel dominates the market, are lower than in
the Stackelberge games, when a channel does dominate the market. This can be attributed to the
higher competition or the lower level of coordination induced by the Nash game. Thus, both
channels are worse off in the Nash game. Consequently, one may argue that Nash game leads to
a lower total retailer’s profitability. Also, one may think that a retailer will perform better if the
channel with highest customer preference leads. Our study shows that this is not always the case.
When one channel is dominant and all return rates are low, then a retailer will have a higher
chance of profitability when the channel with a significantly high level of customer preference is
the price leader. In contradistinction, when return rates are not low then a retailer will have a
higher chance of profitability when the price leader is the channel with a significant rate of
return, even if the competing channel has a high level of customer preference. This is due to the
pricing behaviour occurs naturally in the Stackelberge games. It has been observed that a channel
will always charge higher prices if it is leading rather than following. This may be due to the fact
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that a price leader’s main objective is to reduce the effect of return, while a price follower’s main
objective is to be competitive once it observes the leader’s price. These results indicate that game
schemes have a significant impact on retailer payoffs, and that the schemes have a substantial
influence on sales and customer welfare.
8.

CONCLUSIONS
This paper has studied the effect that same- and cross-channel customer returns have on a

dual-channel retailer wherein an enterprise runs both a physical store and an online store. The
results confirm that accounting for both types of returns is very important when calculating
channels’ optimal prices. Closed form formulas were assigned to the optimal unified price and
the differential prices set by centralized management. The optimal prices for the competing
channels were derived using the Online-Leading Stackelberge game, Physical-Leading
Stackelberge game and Nash game.
It has been found that customer preference for a certain channel greatly affects the pricing
strategy of that channel. For example, the optimal price for a channel facing competition will
increase as customer preference for that channel also increases. Unlike common perception, the
optimal price for a channel under centralized management and a differential pricing strategy
could either increase or decrease when customer preference for that channel increases. The
previous setting may not possess a customer preference value that causes both channels to
optimally be priced equally. When the physical store’s rate of return is less than all online store’s
rates of returns, then the optimal unified price will increase as customer preference for the
physical store increases.
From the numerical example it has been observed that the prices set by centralized
management are higher than those set by competing channels. When compared to Stackelberge
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competitions, Nash competition imposes lower pricing strategies for both channels and lower
total supply chain profitability. Under the Stackelberge scheme, the pricing strategy for a channel
under leadership is at least as high as the pricing strategy for the same channel under fellowship.
Consequently, total supply chain performance has a proclivity to be better when being led by the
channel with high rate of returns and high customer preference. Such conditions promote
competition over coordination with price unification.
In this work, we assumed the full rationality of all players. However, this is not always
the case and players may have bounded rationality, may adopt a strategy that is not optimal, and
may not know the rationality of other players. Thus, an evolutionary game theoretic approach
can be used to examine price competition within a duopolistic dual-channel system. Besides, an
evolutionary game theoretic approach may be used to study different return policies in dualchannel retailing where a store has a set of different policies to choose from namely: no refund,
partial refund, and full refund. Unlike the classical game theory used in this paper, players in the
aforementioned game dynamically compete or interact until an evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS) is successfully achieved (Leboucher et al. 2016).
Another extension to this research is to consider multiple products and related constraints
such as a total demand or budget limitation. The problem for the multi-product DCR with
customer returns could be formulated as a complex nonlinear integer programming model and it
may be difficult to find a closed form solution for the model. Similar to De et al. (2017), metaheuristic algorithms can be used to solve the problem and their corresponding system behaviour
could be compared.
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